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INTRODUCTION: PRIVATE INVESTMENT CLAIMS
AGAINST STATE AND
PROVINCES - THE IMPACT OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 ON
SUB-FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
J. Michael Robinson
MR. ROBINSON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. This is an im-
portant topic and we have some outstanding speakers.
On my left is Mr. Mcllroy, who, among his many accomplishments, runs
a trade law, lobbying and strategic advice firm, called Mc~lroy and Mcllroy.
Mr. Mcflroy worked as senior policy advisor for Canada's very first Minister
of International Trade when we were just starting to try to understand these
legal issues relating to the Canada/U.S. free trade agreement and later the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He was in the U.S. as a
visiting attorney with O'Melveny & Meyers for a while and knows that side
of things. He is fluently bilingual. He took his degree at the Universite de
Montreal, has a degree at the Sorbonne and received his law degree from
Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto.
On my right is Mr. Price, who is with Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Mur-
phy. This is a well-known, major Washington firm. He is an expert on trade
law and was Principal Deputy General Counsel at the United States Trade
Representative (U.S.T.R.). He was the lead negotiator on investment issues
in NAFrA. He received his Juris Doctorate from Harvard and attended
Cambridge.
I am going to introduce the topic briefly by telling a war story, which
illustrates how many governments can do pretty foolish things when they do
not understand the effect of investor-state law. This story involves the To-
ronto airport and the so-called second terminal.
In Toronto we did the first major Build- Operate- Transfer (BOT) project
in Canada, I guess one of the first ones in North America to build, own, op-
erate and transfer, for a new terminal there called the third terminal. It is a
forty-year BOT in a private consortium of builders and developers and opera-
tors got together and financed it, and built it and ran it.
Faskin Martineau DuMoulin LLP, Toronto, Ontario.
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The consortium included a major U.S. participant, Lockheed, which not
only builds aircraft but is in the airport construction and management busi-
ness as well.
This terminal was so successful it was decided to do a BOT for the sec-
ond terminal which was falling apart and needed to be rebuilt, so that con-
tract was duly let, bid, and signed up.
All appropriate authorizations, orders in council and everything else were
given, and it was a done deal.
Along came an election and the current prime minister said, "Well, those
chaps, those conservatives do too much boondoggling and pork barreling and
rewarding their Tory faithful." He made Terminal Two an election issue,
claiming that one of the principal members of this consortium, the same one,
interestingly enough, that had built Terminal Three, had had the contract for
Terminal Two, was a Tory and a major Tory fundraiser and, obviously, he
had been given the contract for that reason, and if elected, he was going to
tear it up. He was elected. He did. He tore the contract up by way of a bill
in parliament, which said, "It never existed and nobody has any rights under
it, except what I decide they shall have. If I decide to give them to minor
compensation for their lost costs then they will be lucky fellows and that is
it."
A few people brought to the attention of the government. The Minister of
Justice said, "Hey, guys, you can do this to Canadians. Our Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, our so-called bill of rights, does not protect property
rights, it does not protect corporations, and it protects personal rights and
individuals. This is all fine. Parliament is supreme. You can tear up their
contract and tell them they have nothing and that is legal, but you cannot do
that to the U.S., and the U.S. member of the consortium can get full compen-
sation."
This was quite a surprise to some people up in Ottawa, not withstanding
they signed both the free trade agreement and NAFTA by this point. So the
bill was blocked at the senate. Then the question was whether you are going
to reintroduce it in the Commons and go through again.
They came up with a brilliant solution to avoid this problem, a great shell
game: They gave the airport, which had been owned by the Federal Gov-
ernment as a public utility, to a municipal, not-for-profit corporation, and
gave the airport this new, non-profit corporation called the Greater Toronto
Airports Authority enough money to buy Terminal Three, in fact, for quite an
inflated price. The money just happened to go to the same guys who had the
claim on Terminal Two. The public never figured out this shell game. The
problem went away.
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That was the case that never was, and, of course, it would have been such
a slam-dunk case against Canada, that I do not think anybody in this room
would question the fact that if Lockheed had brought an action under Chapter
11 as an expropriated foreign investor, they would have won, they would
have got compensation for the loss of their profits for forty years, which was
very easily calculable with a five dollar adding machine, based on the forty -
year BOT and the Canadians would have got zip. I think politically that
would not have flown in Canada.
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